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Abstract. Public-key signature systems can be vulnerable to attack if the
protocols for signi_ng messages allow a cryptanalyst to obtain signatures on
arldr'L'ry messages of tile cryptanalysL's choice. This vulnerability is shown to
ur'i;~(~ frum th0. homomorphic sLructure of public-key systems. A signature
proloeol thill foils the ullack is described.
Gif Ca.i.e,gori:1R and Subject DescriploTS: E.3 [Vata]: Data Encryption - public key
crYfJL(lsysLern::; .
(jwnwu'.1. TeTnJ.: :::::ecurily.
Add:iHonal }wy lI'o'rds and PhTuse~;: digital signature, cryptanalysis,
cryplcgraphic protocol, hashing, homomorphism,
1. ]·'ormcrly "A Note on StrcnB~hcninB RSA llnd Other Public-Key CryptosysLems",
2. l~c:;c;jrch suppo:1.ed in part by NSf' Grant MCSBO-l5<l.EW,
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1. Introduction
George Davida [11 has recently Wlcovered a potentially serious weakness in
the basic prolocol for signing messages llsing the RS1\ public-key cryptosysLem
[10J. Assuming thal a crypLanCllysl can gelD. user Lo sign arbiLrnry messages
Lhat Illny be meaningless. the cryptanalyst can decrypt ciphertext encrypted
Ulldcr Lhe victim's public key or forge the vic Lim's signature an a meaningful
mcssugtl. This is done by getting Lhe victim to sign new messages derived from
Llw inLercepLed ciphertext or chosen message. Although Davida refers to t.he
aLlilck as a "chosen signature" atlack, it is actually a "chosen message" attack
since the cryptanalyst chooses messages Lo be signed rather than signatures Lo
be validaLed. The attack also works with other public-key systems,
The atLack does not break the HSA system in the traditional sense whereby
a cryptanalyst can obtain secret keys, Indeed, Lhe attack is carried out wilhout
knowledge of Lhe victim's private key. In this sense, the attack is much weaker
Lhan a "chosen plaintext" attaek on a conventional cryptosysLem, which, if
sllcce~~;ful, breaks the system.
Wc uelieve that a signalure proLocal [or public-key syslems developed by
Davies and Pl'iec [ 2] [oils Lhe attack fCJr any pllblic~key system. We shall first
dCsc.:l'ibe Lhe weakness in the basic HSA protocol, and then show how it
gc!lt.Tult7.cS La other public-key syslems. We shall then describe the protocol by
Davics and Price.
2. The Busic USA Protocol
l.eL'n be Lhe modulll:l for the vicUm's rWA cl'yptosysLem, where n = pq for
larp;e ~~c.:tTt:l [,rimes p anti t]; and leL e illld [1 be the public and privr.tLc
exponenLs 1'l'::JpecUvc!y, whet'u e and d arc multiplicative inverses mod
cp(n) ~ (P-·J)(:l-l). TIle puulic exponent e is llsed Lo encipher and validate
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signatures; the private exponent d to decipher and sign messages. To send the
USE:r a secret message J.f. the sender enciphers M by computing C =M rJ mod '/1,;
the user deciphers the ciphertext.. C by compuLing Cd mod n =M. Similarly.
Lh~ user signs a message U by computing S ;..; },ld mod n: the receiver validates
the si~nature S by computing Sf! mod n. = M. The security of the system rests
011 the assumpLion thaL a cryptanalY5L cannot determine the factors p and g of
n. (~ee [5] for a tutorial on the number theory behind the RSA system.)
3. Tile Potential W~aknc::m
SUfJpose t,.haL a cryptanalyst has intercepted ciphertext C sent to the
vicLim, where C =Me mod n. Davida [1] has shown how the cryptanalyst may be
able Lo cleL81'mine M wlLhout knowing the deciphering exponent d. I-lis lUethod
Vloek:.:; as follows:
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l\lgorilhm 1. Davida's met.hod for obtainina Cd mod n ::: M.
1. Factor C inlo t::=: 2 components. obtaininp, C::: C t C2• .. C, (the components
Ci need not be prime or prime powers -- any dccomposltion of C will do).
This implies that M also factors into t corresponding components
M \..... Ml , where
C::: Ct C2"'Ct ;:: (M1Mz'''Md
e modn ::: (JJ,)1l (Jd 2)1l .. , (JJdGmodn,
andMi ::: C?modn (i::: l, ... ,t).
2 Gel the viP-tiro lo sign a message x and messages
XCI mod n, ... ,XCt mod n. X can be a new message Dr a message preV'i-
Dusly signed by the victim. The messages XC.\, .. ,XC" might be lines in
~;omc HIe Lhe crypLanalyst requests Lhe vicUm to sign line by line Lo uck-
nowledge ,'eceipt. The signatures obtained are thus:
S ::: X d modn
0'\ ::: (A'Cdd mod n (i=1. .... I).
3. Compute the multiplicative inverse ::i-I mod n of the signature S, getting
S·--':.: X· d mod n ,
4, Multiply this by each of the 8. to obtain the f,h:
,"'-',<"'( moJn ::X-ll(X(~)U luoun::: C:fmodn ::Mi
5, Compute the product M ,M2"·M, mod 71. :: M,
The Hllaek can also be made using X ::: 1. Then Lhe cryptanalyst needs only the
l sip,llalures S~ :.: C...rI. mod n ::: Mi. This attack, however, may be easier to detect
sirlce U1C [aclors of C and M arc exposed,
In the unlikely evcnllhaL S is not relatively prime to 71., S does not have a
lUliquc'inverse mod n. Hut in lhis case, Lhe cryptanalyst can racLor 71. because
S will be a multiple ofp or q, whence gcd(S, 71.)::: p or q,
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Judy Moore has uncovered an even simpler attack that requires only one
~ignal.llrc:
AlgoriLhm 2. Moore's method [or obtaining c;d mod n ::: M.
1. Pick an arbitrary S and compute X::: Sa mod n; this implies
S ::: X rl modn .
2. Gel the vict.im to sibn the message XC mod n, obtaining the signature
S1::: (XC)d mod n .
3. Compute 5-\ mod n ::: X-d mod n.
4. Multiply 8-\ by 5. to obtain kI:
S-IS,ffiodn::: X-d(XC)Q:modn::: Cd rnodn =M
Vlldl.::l' the assumption that Lhe RSA system is CT}'PtographicaUy strong
(co'T,puLL\liun~lIyinfc<J.siblc to break), Moore's method I:=; optimal in Lhe sense of
l'e(~Llirjl1g the minimal number of signalures from the victim. If it were not, then
we could t1ccrypL ciphertext wiLhout any cooperation from the victim, thereby
Because both algorithms compute Cd mod n, they may also be used to
forge the victim's signature on a message C chosen by the cryptanalyst.
1. Gcncrali:7.ine the Hcsulls to Other Publie~l{cySystems
CDmHtlcr' an arbitrary public-key erypLosysLcm with private deciphering
(sii~nill.i..ll·e) Lran::;forrnaLion D and public enciphering ~ransformationE = V-I.
We il;iLially ,-t3~Umc Lbe public-l<cy system can be uscd for boLh message
L:t1I~rypl.l0n (Le.. !)(E'(X» = X can be computed) and signatures (Le.,
l.','(IJ(X) = X Curl be compuLed): signaLure-only systems arc considered later.
I\'lo(ln~'::; meLhod cxLends to Lhe sysLem if the message space forms a group
wiLh binary operator a and identity element 1; the signature space forms a group
·6·
with a binary operator. also denoted by n, and identity 1; and the deciphering
LrLl.Tlsl'O{'rnaLion D is a homomorphism from the message group to the signuLure
group; that is, the following properLies hold [or all messages X, Y, and Z:
1. b(Y'Z) = (X. Y).Z (AssociaLivity - for Step 4)
0 X~l=l·X=X (fdentity - for Steps 3 and 4),.
3. X_X-1 =X-1·X= 1 (Inverses - for Step 3)
4. D(X' Y) =D(X). D(Y) (Homomorphism - for Step 4)
t\1{'orilhm:J computes D(C) to decrypt C or forge the victim's signature on C:
AlgoriUuTI 3. GcneraHzaLion of Moore's method to obtain D(C).
1. Pick 5 and compute X =E(S); this implies S =D(X).





= I.D(C) = D(C).
The HSA system fiLs this general pattern, where both the message and
signoLurc groups are defined by the integers relath7ely prime to n together with
Illulliplication. The deciphering Lmnsformation is a homomorphism because
(Xy)d mod n = [(Xli mod n)( y<t mod n)J mod n .
H i~ not. Sll!,!H'isille LhaL a crypLosyslcm for which the deciphering
transfc·rmotion is o'l homomorphism is vulnerable to certain typcs of attack.
HiVC8L, ,~dlcmiln, and Derlouzos [9J showed that such cryptosytems can have
i.nherenL weaknesses.
- ';' -
We now consider the case where Lhe public-key system is a signature-only
sy~-tCl1l. Thus, the cryptanalysL i~ interesLed only in foreing a signature all a
m8SSUgC C. '1'0 see how Moore's method can be applied in this case, we consider
Lhe individual steps in Algorithm 3. Step 1 cannot be performed because
rnL'3~i1gcs cannoL be enciphered in a signature-only sysLem. BuL since the
objecLive is Lo obLain X and S such that S = D(X), Lhis sLcp can be replaced by
onl~ Lh,kL ooLains Lhe vieLim's sign,lLure on .:l. message X picked by the
crypL<AnatysL. SLeps 2 and 3 can be performed wiLhout modification. Step 4 can
be performed a::; long as D is a homomorphism. If D is not a homomorphism but
gis, Lhen a slightly different approach can be taken in Step 4 since the
objccl.ivc is slrnply La find a signature that passes the validation tcsL. Algorithm
4, ',',!liclt gcnerulizes a method by DeMilio and Merritt [4], uses this approach:
!I.lgorHhm 1:. .forge a Signature on C.
1. Pick X nnd get the vtctirn to return a signature 8 = D (X): this implies
x = E(8).
2. Get Lhe victim to return the signature 5 I = D (X. C).
3, Compute 3-1.
,~. Compute the signat'.lie 8 2 =5-1• S l' 52 is a valid signature of C because
N(S,) = J\'(8~'-8,) = I':(S-')-A'(8,)
:::: H(S)-I. 8(0'1) (because g is a homomorphism)
~ X~'. (X • C) = C.
Shamir's signature-only knapsack scheme [11] (see also [5]) fits this
patle:rn. I-Jere, the signaLure validation LransformaLicn E is given by
/','U'::')::"; SA muu h, where 1'1 i~ a k-bit pl'imc, Jl and S' are inLeger veeLors of
""long Ltl :~k , and SA denoLes the seali.lr producL. '....hcre X is ~ integer mod n. The
llW$~:c\[:C group is defined by the integers mod n with addition and identity 0;
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the signature group by integer vectors or length 2k with vector addition and
idcnLiLy Q. Although f) is not a homomorphism, P; is a homomorphism from the
signature group Lo Lhe message group, since for all signatures S I and S2:
(5, +S~)A modn;:; (SIA modn + S?Amodn)modn.
F'or Shamir's 3)'stem, Algorithm '1- becomes the mcLhotl in DeMilla and Merritt
Algorilllm 5. DeMilla's and MerriLL's Method for Forging a Signature S2 on C with
Shamil"s Signature System.
1. Pick X and get the victim to return the sie;n~~ure S such that
SA mod 11. ::: X.
2. Ge;:L the victim to return a signature 51 on X + C such that
SIA moun;:; X+C.
:J. Compute S-l ::: -8.
-i. CllmplLL:~ Lhe signature 52 =-8 + 8\. S:!. is a valid signature of C because
1.:(82 ) = R(-S + 51) = (-5' + Sl)A modn
= (-SA mod 11. + S IA mod 11.) mod n =[-X + (X + C)] mod n C .
DeMilio ilnd Merritt also consider similar attacks on variants of the RSA
system. 'I'hc~e systems all have a underlying homomorphic structure (though
not l'xplicitly identified as such in lheir paper). which explains their
vLl1nerubilily to this general method of attack.
b. Al'! !mprO\,·cJ Prolocol
l"or Lhe ..d.Lncks Lo succeed, Lhc cryptanulysl must bc ablc to r,ct the victim
to f'lign essenl.[i.\Uy arbitn~l'Y mcs~ages LhaL are supplied by the cryptanalyst and
<Arc nol likely to be meaningful. To protect against such attacks. Users can .3ign
only meaningful messages of their choice. Messages received from other users
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~iln bL: rnodin~cl before signing.
n'c now describe a proLocol that protects against the attacks by
Lram;[orming messugcs with a one-way pubHc function h before signing. A
mcssLlge M is thus signed by computing
S =D(h(M».
The futlction h should saLisfy four properties:
1. h shoultl destroy all homomorphic structure in the underlying public-key
crypLosysLelll; that is, h(Xa Y) to. h(X)-h(Y) must hold. Moreover, for
almost all X and Y, D(h(X. Y) " D(h(X». D(h(Y» should hold. Then the
cryptanalyst cannot factor oUllhc X or Y in a signature D(h (X a Y).
2. h should be computed over entire messages (rather than on a block by
block basis). This will make it difficult for a cryptanalyst to obtain
signutures by inserting blocks into u ilIe that otherwise looks legitimate.
3. h "hould be one-way so that the cryptanalyst cannot obtain a signature on a
message X by requosLing il signature for h -1(X).
1·. "should have the peopcrLy that for any given message X and vulue h(X), it
is computaLionally infeu3ible to tind anothel' message Y such that h (Y) ::::
h(X"). This is needed to prevent forgeries since h(X) can bc computed from
<.l signatllf'C S = D(h (X) by uppJying the public funcLion E' La S.
acluiLiUlli.1l b(~ndiL. Ilec<lu~;e Lhe tr'um:formnlions E(-) and D(h(·» are not
itlY0t·SC~, a c"ypLanalysL cannol hope to decrypL an intcrcepLed cipherLext
messagc C by ~ctting a signature on C.
The idea oi Lransforming mc~sagcs before signing is due to Davies and Price
[2], who desigoL!tI (l prot0col for signing secret messages using a one-way publie
h,1Shjtl!_~ fllncl.loll h l.hd conceals me::l::::agcs anti prevents forgeries. Their
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function h blocks a message M into 56-bit blocks M r, " ... Mr and computes a
digesL
M =h(MJ) =EM~ 0 "". 0 1JMr 0 EMr 0 " ." 0 EU1(I).
where ":M, is l.he DI';S enciphering al~oriLhm kcy'_!u Lo block Mi.' 1 is a random G'}-
bi.L iniLiaH:.-:uLion seed fot' the D~:S, and "0" denoLes function composiLion.
Dccall:';C: the funcLion h can be computed both forwards and backwards (by using
the deciphering lransformations Du) for an arbitn\ry message M, the messilge
musL be repealed in the keys Lo prevent a "meet in the middle" forgery
(compuLe forwards from J using 232 varialions Df the firsL half Df the desired
message and backwards from M using 2:1~ variatiDns of the second half Df the
message; sDrL the resulLs tD find a match, which is likely to occur for "birthday
problcr!l" reasons).
Wolfgang Hitzer has suggested an imprDved hashing functiDn that foils the
med In the middle attack with a single pass over the message. His hashing
funcLion is given by
J.f = h(M,J) = Zr+l'
where
Zi+I.= Ezj ' Iil M,(Zi.) (1 :s i s r)
2, = I,
Zi con;:;:ists or 56 bits selected from Zi. and @ denotes exclusive or. The meet in
Lhe middle atLack is prevented because it is not possible to compute backwards
Lhrough the runclion (i.e., compuLc Zi frolll Zi 1_')'
IIe,LIl I)l':~;-ba~:ed ha~lljllg rlllll~UOtl:-:: would desl.roy Lhe llluJLipHciltivc
::l.nlctlli"l! 01' LIlL' I~~_;i\ ~y~:II.'111 and tlw auditivc strucLure of ]tllaps,lek ~ysLcms"
Ulldcl'IYltlg crypLosysLcnl.
Using Lhe hashing function. the message f,J is signed as S = D([M, lJ),
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where t.he 123~bit block [oM, r] is replicated as many times as necessary to fill
the input block for the signature transformation D.
A signaLure S on all. alleged message fA is validated by first eomputip.g
E(S) = D-l(S) = [ld, 1]; next computing h(M,/) using the public function hand
the ull(.'ged mes::mge M; and [many comparing h(f,fJ) wiLh M. We conjecture,
buL have noL been able Lo prove, LhaL a constant seed f o could be used for all
mcssal:cs wiLhout compromising sceuriLy (in the same way LhaL a constant seed
LS u~wd fol' onC:~Wil'y enct'yplion of passwords). Then Lhe signaLure would be
simply S = D(h(M» as suggcsLed earHer.
The rnessnge M can be Lransmitted either as cleartext (if secrecy is not
needed), as ciphertext encrypted using Lhe receiver's public key, or as
cipherLcxt encrypted using a secret key shared by the sender and receiver (if a
conventional cryptosystem is used for message secrecy, with the public~key
system reserved for signatures and key exchange).
The haslling function has two important advantages besides protecting
againsL signature aLtacks
1. 1L separates the signature Lransformation from the secrecy
Lrunsformation, allowing secrecy Lo implemented wiLh a one~key
~ystem or to be skipped [2]. Yet the separation is achieved without
much message expansion, since each signature (s a single block.
2. It conceals messages so thaL signatures can be publicly disclosed
without revealIng their corresponding messages. This is importanL for
reeo\'cring fr011"1 compromises or direct disclosure of private keys. Let
Dil be the signature key oC user A. In order that a signaLure S of A can
rCillain valid afLer DjJ i::; compromised or dcHberately disclosed, S musL
be bound Lo A'<J currenL publlc key ]<,'.1, limesLamped, and signed by the
public key ~cr\'cr (noLat·y public) lllJ, giving a "signature certificate"
,
- 12 -
[6] G =Dp(T, A, EA , S), where Dp is the signature key of the public
key Server, and l' is the times Lamp. And ill order that S can remain
valid even if IJp is compromised, G must be kept in a public log. 1"01'
this reason, it is important that S conceal the message signed and
have minimal storage requirements. This is achieved with the hashed
signalure method. (for further discllssion of this, see [6].)
6. Conclusions
Davida's discovery demonstrates the fundamental importance of encryption
protocols. 1L is not enough to have an encryption algorithm that is
computationally hard to break; the protocols fol' using the algorithm must also
wiLhsL.:md aLLack. We have identified several properties that should be satisfied
by an)' signature proloeol: in particular, it should destroy any bomomorphic
slr'ucLul'e ill lhe llIHlerlying public-key algorilhm, The signaLure pealocal
dcscribt!d her'e appears to satisfy these properties. }o'urLher research along LhE!
lines initiaLed by Dolev and Yao [7] and DeMillo. Lynch, and Merrill [3] is needed
(or' proving the security of protocols,
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